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JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO TERROR: 
ISSUES, PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS 
The panel was convened at 12:30 P.M. on Friday, March 15, by its chair,JordanJ. Paust, 
Law Foundation Professor, University of Houston Law Center. Professor Paust intro-
duced the panelists: Barry E. Carter, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law 
Center; Allan Gerson, Co-Director, George Washington University Peacebuilding and 
Development Institute;Judge Abraham Sofaer, Hoover Institute, Stanford, and former 
Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State; Michael Scharf, Professor of Law, New England 
School of Law. Opening remarks of the chair led to a lively debate among the panelists 
about issues set forth in general questions posed by the chair and points and counter-
points expressed during the session. A primary purpose of the panel was to consider 
possibilities and implications of responding to terror through criminal and civil sanc-
tions in municipal courts. The panel was co-sponsored by the International Criminal 
Law Interest Group and the International Organizations Interest Group. 
OPENING REMARKs BY JORDAN J. PAUST* 
In 1985, the UN General Assembly "[u]nequivocally" condemned "as criminal, all 
acts, methods and practices ofterrorism wherever and by whomever committed."J The 
UN Security Council also "resolutely" condemned '''all acts of terrorism' ... in all its 
forms, wherever and by whomever committed."2 Similar condemnations of terrorism 
and recognitions that terrorism is an international criminal act, regardless of the motive 
or the status of the perpetrator, occurred in 1989 and in the 1990s.3 Yet none of the 
resolutions defined the terrorism it was proscribing as a matter of international law. 
Most recently, UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (Resolution 1373) reaffirmed the 
Council's "unequivocal condemnation of the terrorist attacks which took place in New 
York, Washington, DC, and Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001,,,4 and decided that 
all states must take certain measures against terrorism. Perhaps most important for this 
panel are the decisions that all states shall "deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, 
support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens";5 shall "[e]nsure that any 
person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration ofter-
rorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice and ensure that ... such 
terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regula-
tions and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts,,;6 and 
shall" [a] fford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with crimi-
nal investigations or criminal proceedings ... , including assistance in obtaining evidence 
in their possession necessary for the proceedings";? and the call upon all states to "prevent 
and suppress terrorist attacks and take action against perpetrators of such acts.,,8 
• Law Foundation Professor, University of Houston Law Center, and panel chair. 
I UN CA Res. 40/61, 40 UN CAOR, Supp. No. 53, at 301, UN Doc. A/40/53 (Dec. 9,1985), reprinted in 
25 ILM 239 (1986). 
2 UN SC Res. 579, UN SCOR, 40th sess., Res. and Decs. at 24, UN Doc. S/INF/41 (1985), reprinted in 25 
ILM 243 (1986). 
3 See, e.g., UN CARes. 49/60 (1994); UN CARes. 46/51, 46 UN CAORat 4, UN Doc. A/46/654 (Dec. 9, 
1991) ; Jordan J. Paust, M. CherifBassiouni et aI., International Criminal Law 995, 1005, 1007 (2d ed. 2000). 
1 SC Res. 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001), reprinted in 40 ILM 1278 (2001). 
5 Id. at para. 2(c). 
6Id. at para. 2(e). 
7 Id. at para. 2 (f). 
8 Id. at para. 3(c). 
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Such unequivocal condemnations of terrorism as criminal wherever it occurs, by 
whomever, and regardless of purpose, provides a clear basis for recognizing universal 
jurisdiction over terrorist acts under customary in ternationallaw. Such unequivocal con-
demnations and the mandates in Resolution 1373 also provide a basis for recognizing 
nonimmunity with respect to civil and criminal sanction strategies. 
A general question to start our discussion is whether such condemnations and Reso-
lution 1373 expand the need and bases for civil or criminal sanctions in domestic legal 
processes. Further, what purposes might be served by civil sanctions and what conse-
quences might follow from expanded use of civil litigation against terrorists and those 
who harbor or support terrorists? Are civil remedies an appropriate response to terror-
ism, especially state-supported terrorism? Should foreign policy control independent 
judicial power? Given the thrust of Resolution 1373, is the Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act too restrictive, especially Section 1605 (a) (7)? Should frozen assets of terrorist-
supporting states be made available for execution of judgments? Should there be greater 
U.S. government cooperation with civil litigants against terrorists and terrorist-support-
ing states, especially in view of the mandates in Resolution 1373? Would it be hypocritical 
to decry the harboring and support of nonstate terrorists while denying civil sanctions 
against states that engage in such conduct? 
What general purposes might be served by criminal prosecution? What limits might 
exist? What consequences might follow? How does Resolution 1373 affect the need for 
prosecution? 
What are the likely advantages and disadvantages of pursuing criminal prosecutions 
in federal district courts, U.S. military commissions, foreign domestic tribunals, ad hoc 
tribunals like the Pan Am 103 tribunal, ad hoc tribunals created pursuant to Council 
decisions (like the international criminal tribunals for Yugloslavia and Rwanda), or the 
expansion ofInternational Criminal Court jurisdiction (eight years after the treaty comes 
into effect)? 
STATE-SUPPORTED TERRORISM AND THE U.S. COURTS: 
SOME FOREIGN POllCY PROBLEMS 
by Barry E. Carter" 
Terrorism is an evil that the United States and other civilized countries should com-
bat aggressively. 
Fortunately, these countries have many tools they can use in their fight against terror-
ism, among them military force (as we have just demonstrated in Mghanistan), covert 
actions, and a variety of economic sanctions against a country or group that supports 
terrorists. These sanctions-which would preferably be applied in union with other coun-
tries, though unilaterally if necessary--can include freezing assets, as well as ending or 
limiting U.S. government programs (ranging from landing rights to foreign aid), cutting 
off exports to or imports from the country supporting terrorists, denying it credit or 
investment funds, and working in the multilateral banks to block loans to the country. 
Clearly the U.S. courts also have a role. For example, individual terrorists should be 
subject to criminal and civil actions whenever we can obtain jurisdiction. 
The more complex questions revolve around suits against foreign states that engage 
in terrorism or provide material support to terrorists. Amendments that started in 1996 
• Professor of Law and Director, Program in International Business and Economic Law, Georgetown 
University Law Center. 
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to the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) now essentially allow a new category 
of suits against a foreign state by (1) U.S. nationals (2) who are seeking money damages 
for personal injury or death (3) "that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial 
killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or re-
sources ... for such an act if such act or provision of material support is engaged in by 
an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his 
or her office, employment, or agency." 1 These suits are an explicit exception to foreign 
sovereign immunity (new subsection (a) (7) of Section 1605, 28 U.S.C. §16050, but the 
exception is limited to suits against the seven states that are designated by the executive 
branch of the U.S. government as a state sponsor of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, 
North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. 
A growing number of cases against these states--especially Iran and Iraq-are based on 
the (a) (7) exception, with many of the suits resulting in very large damage judgments. 
The initial reaction to these awards, or the possibility of future large awards, might well 
be that these countries are getting what they deserve, that "they ought to pay a price." 
The implementation of this statute, however, raises some important questions for the 
long term. What follows is a brief analysis of the experience under the statute and the 
possible future dynamics. 
First, given the understandable hesitancy of Iran, Iraq, and Cuba to appear in U.S. 
courts, U.S. judges have held hearings where only the plaintiffs were represented and 
then the courts entered default judgments. Recently, some judges have then found 
damages-compensatory and punitive-that are reaching or exceeding $300 million 
per American life lost. (By way of comparison, the federal compensation fund for the 
victims of the attacks on September 11 has issued regulations indicating that it will make 
awards ranging from about $1 million to $4 million. The victims' estates, though, can 
also sue terrorists for additional damages.) 
Second, the foreign governments that are identified as supporting terrorists and that 
lose these cases usually have little interest in paying. Moreover, these foreign govern-
ments generally have only limited assets in the United States, usually just those frozen 
when a final rupture occurred in the relations between the two countries. (Countries 
that might run athwart of U.S. foreign policy learned not to leave substantial assets in 
the United States after the United States froze about$12 billion oflranian assets during 
the 1979-1981 hostage crisis.) As a result, successful plaintiffs in these (a) (7) suits are 
hard-pressed to find attachable assets to satisfy their default judgments. 
Third, in reaction to this difficulty of collection, Congress passed a special law (the 
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000).2 Pursuant to its terms, the 
U.S. government has now paid about $350 million out of U.S. taxpayer funds to the 
successful plaintiffs in nine cases against Iran, with the justification that these claims are 
being subrogated to the U.S. government to collect eventually from Iran. The statute 
mightallowjust a few other plaintiffs also to collect from the U.S. government. Not only 
does this law raise questions about why the government should be paying so much to 
only a few plaintiffs, but there is no similar provision for compensating later success-
ful plaintiffs against Iran or for covering any judgments against any other terrorist state, 
except for one case against Cuba. Recognizing this problem, the U.S. Congress in 2001 di-
rected President Bush to submit soon "a legislative proposal to establish a comprehensive 
program to ensure fair, equitable, and prompt compensation for all United States 
I Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §1605(A) (7) (2002). 
2 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106--386, §2002, 114 Stat. 1464, 
amending 28 U.S.C. §§1606, 1610 note (1994 & Supp. V1999) [hereinafter Victims Act]. 
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victims of international terrorism ... that occurred or occurs on or after November 1, 
1979."3 
fourth, how will new U.S. plaintiffs or even the U.S. government with its subrogated 
claims receive payment from these foreign governments? Since most terrorist states are 
unlikely to offer new funds or allow assets to be vulnerable to attachment, it is now likely 
that successful judgment-creditors must wait until a moderate government takes over 
in Cuba, Iran, Iraq, or elsewhere. Then, when that moderate government wants to do 
business with the United States, these judgment-creditors will insist on payment of their 
large judgments, or will begin to attach that country's assets when commercial activities 
resume between the United States and that country. 
Traditionally, outstanding claims between the United States and another country are 
often settled by a foreign claims settlement agreement when the two countries resume 
relations.4 These agreements usually protect a foreign country from any liability beyond 
the agreed loss of frozen or any other assets that the foreign state might agree to con-
tribute. 
In the present situation, however, there are serious questions about whether this is rea-
sonable given the large judgments under the (a) (7) exception and the very limited assets 
now frozen by the U.S. government. The judgment-creditors would strongly object to 
the executive branch and a Congress that has shown itself to be sympathetic to the Ameri-
can plaintiffs, if a proposed agreement were to provide them just a few cents for each 
dollar of their judgments. The new foreign government might not have the resources, 
or might simply be unwilling, to make any m<yor contribution to the settlement. That gov-
ernment might conclude that it is easier to do business with Japan or the European Union. 
Also, since these judgments are based on federal law (the FSIA) , there is some ques-
tion whether an executive agreement, whether entered into by the president alone or 
approved by Congress, could provide that judgment-creditors receive less than full 
compensation without giving them a takings claim against the U.S. government in the 
U.S. Court of Claims. 
Given all these questions about how the statute is presently implemented, it seems 
timely to consider possible changes in the (a) (7) exception. 
First, the exception now provides that the foreign state be afforded "a reasonable 
opportunity to arbitrate the claim in accordance with accepted international rules of 
arbitration" if"the act occurred in the foreign state against which the claim has been 
brought."5 Presumably this reflects a recognition that the foreign state might have rea-
son to question the impartiality of the U.S. courts. Might this provision be expanded to 
offer reasonable opportunity for international arbitration in any (a) (7) case? Why should 
arbitration be available ifIran is alleged to support terrorist torture or murder in Iran, 
but not when Iran is alleged to have supported a terrorist act in Israel or Lebanon? 
Second, should there be a cap on the damage awards? Tucked away in the 2000 law 
that compensated several of the successful plaintiffs was language that repealed a 1998 
provision allowing plaintiffs to seek punitive damages against the foreign states.6 How-
ever, the amendment still allows plaintiffs to seek punitive damages against foreign 
agencies or instrumentalities, so its impact is not clear. In any case, there might be an 
argument for limiting total damage awards per victim against foreign states, agencies, 
or instrumentalities. That way, the likely carryover to successor moderate governments 
would be less burdensome on future relations. 
3 Act Making Appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and 
Related Agencies for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30,2001, PLl07-77, §626 (Nov. 28, 2001). 
4 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 680-81 (1981). 
528 U.S.C. §1605(a) (7) (B) (1). 
6 Victims Act, supra note 2. 
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Third, as Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter of Harvard Law School has suggested, should 
(a) (7) essentially be repealed and these suits not be allowed against foreign govern-
ments or their agencies and instrumentalities? A related statute, the Flatowamendment, 
still could allow suits against foreign officials, employees, or agents of these terrorist-sup-
porting states. 7 That way the judgments are personal to the individuals who supported 
the terrorist acts and do not continue against a new government with new officials. 
Fourth, should the judgments against a terrorist state be conditioned to lapse upon a 
major change in its government? As part of the condition, the U.S. executive branch would 
make the determination that there was a sufficiently genuine change. This approach 
would, incidentally, provide an incentive (though admittedly not a strong one) for these 
terrorist governments to change. To be sure, the traditional rule in international law is 
that a successor government succeeds to these debts, but it is not ironclad. Moreover, the 
FSIA is a U.S. statute and the terms of a damage award under it can be defined by statute. 
One success story might be about to occur, where a suit against a terrorist-supporting 
state has led to that state paying compensation to the estates of the victims. The Qaddafi 
government of Libya apparently is close to making a substantial payment to the families of 
about 250 Americans killed when a bomb brought down Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, 
Scotland, in 1988. An (a) (7) suit is pending. President Qaddafi, apparently seeking to 
normalize relations not only with Europe but also with the United States, is willing to 
pay a price of over three billion dollars. Even if a settlement occurs, and the (a) (7) suit 
deserves some of the credit, it is not clear how the suggested changes to the (a) (7) excep-
tion would have discouraged or prevented a similar settlement in the these circumstances. 
Above all,just as the U.S. Congress recen tly asked the Bush Administration for a legis-
lative proposal for a "comprehensive program to ensure fair, equitable, and prompt 
compensation for all [U.S.] victims of international terrorism," now would seem to be 
the time to consider seriously some changes in the FSIA. 
Terrorism should be fought. Arguably, however, there might be conditions or a limit 
on large judgments that might miss their intended targets and could hamper future 
U.S. relations with new, moderate foreign governments. 
TERRORISM AS WAR 
by Abraham D. So/aero 
The devastating consequences of the attacks of September 11, 2001 led President 
Bush to declare a "war" on terrorism. The first stage of this war was a full-scale military 
operation in Mghanistan, which destroyed the Taliban and AI Qaeda as fighting forces, 
and replaced the Taliban regime with an internationally approved transition govern-
ment. The operation has had the enthusiastic support of the American people, Congress, 
the UN Security Council, and most sovereign states. No doubt, the future will hold 
many surprises, and plenty of complications and disappointments. But clearly, the United 
States has embarked on a new, and dramatically different policy in dealing with terror-
ism than it has followed for many years. 
7 Pub. L. No. 104-208, §101 (c), 110 Stat. 3009-172, (1996), (codified at 28 U.S.C. §1605 note). In Hill v. 
Republic ofIraq, 175 F.Supp.2d 36 (D.D.C. 2001) ,Judge Jackson issued an order against President Saddam 
Hussein for $300 million in punitive damages in an (a) (7) action brought by several people who had been 
detained and mistreated in 1990 after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The court characterized Saddam Hussein 
as "an instrumentality" of Iraq (and hence subject to punitive damages), but the court could also have 
reached the same result under the Flatow amendment. 
• George P. Shultz Distinguished Scholar & Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University; 
Professor of Law, by Courtesy, Stanford Law School. 
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For years now, presidents have denounced terrorist attacks on Americans and pro-
mised to "pursue" attackers until they "are brought to justice." What President Bush, Sr. 
and President Clinton meant when they promised to bring terrorists to 'Justice," how-
ever, was to bring them to trial. They used the FBI to investigate, to seek out evidence, 
and then to pursue through the criminal process those found to be responsible. The 
effort was certainly appropriate, legally and morally; terrorism is crime. But it was wholly 
ineffectual as a way to defend the American people. 
Terrorism as Crime 
Modern forms of terrorism began in earnest in the 1960s. The world was still emerg-
ing from colonialism and state-sponsored racism. People in South Mrica, and in other 
Mrican states, attacked civilian targets to instill a sense of terror in the white community 
and white-dominated governments that ruled by force. Catholics in Northern Ireland 
did the same thing as part of their effort to gain greater rights or to drive out the British 
government. In India, Israel, and many other states, freedom from British or other 
control had been won in part through such attacks. In Israel, attacks on Jewish civilians 
were ongoing, as part of an effort to destroy Israel entirely. 
No international consensus then existed that these terrorist acts, including the killing 
of civilians, were unlawful. Politically motivated violence had a favored position in inter-
national affairs, including international law. The United Nations General Assembly 
(Assembly) debates on terrorism in 1972 illustrate this point. In that year, Japanese 
terrorists sympathetic to the Palestinian cause attacked travelers in Lod Airport, Israel, 
killing twenty-eight people and wounding seventy-eight; and PLO terrorists of the Black 
September organization murdered eleven members of the Israeli Olympic team in Munich. 
Secretary-General Waldheim called on the Assembly to place on its 1972-1973 agenda 
an item entitled: "Measures to prevent terrorism and other forms of violence which 
endanger or take innocent human lives or jeopardize fundamental freedoms." A storm 
of protest erupted. How could the subject of terrorism be considered without consid-
ering its causes? Waldheim backed off. He assured the Assembly that he did not intend 
to affect principles enunciated by the General Assembly regarding colonial and depen-
dent peoples seeking independence and liberation. During the debates that followed 
that and later proposals, it became clear that many states regarded acts of terror as 
lawful when undertaken by persons deprived of basic human rights, dignity, freedom, 
or independence from foreign occupation. 
It was not until December 1985 that the Assembly finally condemned "unequivocally 
... as criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism." Even that resolution, 
however, reaffirmed each people's inalienable right to self-determination and the 
legitimacy of struggles against colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien 
domination. Many state representatives affirmed the right to engage in all necessary 
actions in these struggles. 
Meanwhile, however, the international community began to reach agreement that 
certain acts were criminal in all circumstances and should confer jurisdiction on all states 
to prosecute them, or alternatively an obligation to extradite persons charged with such 
acts to other states for prosecution. This concept as applied to piracy and the slave trade 
was well established in international law. It was also part of the Genocide Convention, 
adopted by many states after WWlI. The Hague Conven tion on Hijacking was approved 
in 1971; it required all ratifying states to make hijackings criminal, regardless of political 
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purpose. It was followed by conventions against acts jeopardizing aircraft (1973), for the 
prevention of attacks on diplomats (1977), the taking of hostages (1979), torture (1984), 
and maritime terrorism (1988). 
Terrorism as Aggression 
The basic problem remained, however: What could be done when states failed to 
satisfY their obligations under these conventions or other principles of international law? 
The UN Charter provides that nothing within it shall be read to restrict the "inherent" 
right of self-defense, 1 but many international lawyers read the Charter to limit this tradi-
tional right by construing it to require, among other things, a conventional attack on 
the territory of one state by the regular forces of another state. This means that a state 
could support a group of terrorists in an attack on Americans outside the United States 
without giving rise to any right for the United States to take military action against it. 
Moreover, even though states are obliged by UN resolutions to refrain from supporting 
terrorists or giving them sanctuary from which they can attack other states, the breach 
of these obligations was not understood to confer authority on a state attacked by such 
terrorists to take military action on the territory of the state that gave them sanctuary. 
Presidents and congresses have rejected these limitations on the use of force, but 
most scholars, and many governments, have regularly condemned U.S. and other mili-
tary actions that went beyond conventional doctrine. Perhaps the most astonishing 
example of this is the UN resolution condemning Israel for rescuing its nationals from 
Uganda, even though the Idi Amin government was assisting the terrorists. 
The Reagan administration was forced to address the proper means for responding 
to terrorism after a series of attacks on U.S. nationals and interests abroad, beginning 
with the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon in 1982. Administration officials were 
divided on whether to use force in the nation's self-defense, and in particular whether 
to act against states that gave support or sanctuary to terrorist groups. Secretary of State 
George P. Shultz strongly advocated policies to prevent acts of terror against the United 
States, reasoning that this could be achieved only through proactive means. 
After Libya supported attacks by terrorists on civilians at the Rome and Vienna air-
ports in December 1985, killing nineteen, including five Americans, President Reagan 
warned Libya that the United States regarded it as responsible for such attacks and that 
they gave rise to the right of self-defense. Secretary Shultz stated our position in terms 
of state responsibility: "A state which supports terrorist or subversive attacks against an-
other state, or which supports or encourages terrorist planning and other activities 
within its own territory, is responsible for such attacks. Such conduct can amount to an 
ongoing armed aggression against the other state under international law." Two months 
later Libya arranged for terrorists to bomb a disco in Berlin, killing two and wounding 
some fifty Americans. The United States responded with a military attack on Libyan 
facilities, including a compound in which Colonel Qadaffi sometimes lived. 
Back to the Courts 
When George H. Bush became president in 1989, the doctrine of the Reagan admin-
istration was not explicitly abandoned but the policy of responding to terrorist attacks 
with force was discarded. The turning point was the bombing of Pan Am 103 in that 
year. Instead of relying on intelligence to determine who was responsible for that attack, 
I UN CHARTER, art. 51. 
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President Bush sent out the FBI to investigate. Mter about two years, two intelligence 
operatives of the Libyan government were indicted for the crime. Despite the fact that 
the Libyan government must have authorized the attack, President Bush took no 
military action. Instead, he secured resolutions from the Council requiring that the two 
individuals be surrendered to the United States or the United Kingdom for trial, and 
that Libya pay compensation to the families of the victims, imposing massive economic 
sanctions on Libya until it satisfied the resolutions. Years later, Libya finally agreed to 
surrender the two agents for trial, in the Hague, before Scottish judges. In exchange, 
the Council sanctions were lifted. 
A long period of preparation and trial ensued, ending in the conviction of one agen t 
and the acquittal of the other. An appeal by the convicted individual was rejected. Well 
over ten years have passed since the indictment, however, and no compensation has yet 
been paid by Libya. More important, no one expects President Qadaffi or any of his 
officials to be pursued for a crime they must have approved. 
President Clinton used force against Iraq for fomenting a plan to assassinate former 
President Bush, and against AI Qaeda immediately after the destruction of two U.S. 
embassies in Mrica, but both these uses of force were extremely limited. The first was an 
attack on a single building housing the Iraqi intelligence service; in the second numer-
ous missiles were fired at a camp at which AI Qaeda officials had held a meeting. Other-
wise, the only measures taken against terrorists during the last two presidencies have 
been several prosecutions of those low-level operatives the United States was fortunate 
enough to arrest. This policy of dealing with the terrorist threat allowed Osama bin 
Laden and his leadership, and the state that has given them sanctuary, time to plan, 
prepare, and implement new attacks of increasing seriousness with impunity. 
Prosecutors and investigators were deservedly proud when, on May 29,2001, ajury in 
New York ruled that four defendants were guilty of conspiring with Osama bin Laden to 
bomb American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on August 7, 
1998.2 The bombings killed 224 people, including twelve Americans, injured thousands, 
and caused property and other damage of several hundred million dollars. Convicting 
responsible individuals establishes that they are subject to the rule oflaw; brings a sense 
of justice to survivors and relatives; lends credibility to the pledge that terrorists who kill 
Americans will be pursued until captured, prosecuted, and punished; and can lead to 
information helpful in capturing and prosecuting others, preventing future attacks, and 
exposing the aims and methods of terrorist groups. 
But an antiterrorism policy based principally on criminal prosecution has created the 
misleading impression that the U.S. government is providing the American people with 
meaningful protection. It is uncomfortably like playing the computer game "Where in 
the World Is Carmen San Diego?" in which player investigators are assigned cases involv-
ing spectacular crimes-for example, stealing the Golden Gate Bridge-committed by 
members of Carmen's extensive gang. Investigators then dash off to collect evidence, 
flying from place to place, based on clues received from witnesses and documents. 
Gradually, a successful investigator puts together enough evidence about the culprit to 
establish probable cause for an arrest. The investigator must then secure a warrant, and 
thereafter may arrest the correct person, and only that person, when he or she appears 
on the screen. Every successful arrest is a win, even though the boss-the daring and 
elusive Carmen San Diego-remains at large, arranging for other gang members to 
2 Benjamin Weiser, The Terror Verdict: The Overoiew; 4 Guilty in Terror Bombings of 2 U.S. Embassies in Africa; 
Jury to Weigh 2 Executions, N.Y. TIMES, May 30,2001, atAl. 
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commit new crimes. Successful investigators are congratulated and promoted. It is pos-
sible to arrest Carmen San Diego herself, but only after all her numerous henchmen 
have been jailed, after which in any event a reincarnated Carmen San Diego appears, 
and the game goes on. 
Contrasting Objectives 
The ultimate aim of criminal prosecution is to capture and deter those responsible 
for terrorist attacks. Necessarily, though, each prosecution is of specific individuals who 
are known to have perpetrated specific crimes. While Osama bin Laden and some of 
his top associates were indicted along with the four actually tried in 2001, they cannot 
be reached by the criminal process so long as they stay in Mghanistan, which refuses to 
extradite or prosecute them. 
By contrast, an effort to deal with bin Laden and his group as enemies would focus 
on bin Laden himself and every other member of AI Qaeda, regardless of their suscep-
tibility to prosecution for particular crimes. The objective would not be convictions of 
particular AI Qaeda members, but ending the threat the gang poses. 
Reliance on criminal prosecution to combat international terrorism has led after each 
bin Laden attack to an intensive investigation led by the FBI. Given its aim of arresting 
and prosecuting the actual perpetrators of each offense, FBI investigators strive to find 
usable evidence to identify specific suspects; to secure search and arrest warrants; and 
to extradite and prosecute those brought to trial. To use evidence at trial, moreover, 
prosecutors have to satisfy rules related to reliability, and the need for usable evidence 
often leads prosecutors to offer deals to participants who are sometimes more culpable 
than those actually prosecuted. 
An approach that targets bin Laden as an enemy of the United States also requires 
investigation but it attempts primarily to determine who was ultimately responsible, 
rather than to build criminal cases against particular perpetrators. The test for evidence 
is reliability, not admissibility; and the strength of its value is judged, not by any specific 
legal standard but by whether the evidence justifies the measures the United States con-
siders taking. Deals made with bin Laden's associates would be to obtain cooperation 
in destroying his capacity to attack the United States, rather than to find evidence to 
prosecute underlings. 
Antiterrorism efforts must ultimately be judged by whether they prevent attacks. Any 
conceivable deterrent effect of criminal prosecutions of low-level conspirators is les-
sened by the fact that they take years to complete and may take place after additional 
attacks. Criminal prosecution seems no more effective against bin Laden and his leader-
ship than the fantasy prosecutions of Carmen San Diego. Law enforcement activity 
cannot be expected to shut down terrorist organizations operating in hostile and uncoop-
erative states like Mghanistan. Nor is Mghanistan likely to be convinced by successful 
prosecutions to surrender bin Laden; the Mghan information ministry condemned the 
embassy bombing convictions as "unfair," and promised not to hand over bin Laden 
"under any circumstances," calling him "a great holy warrior ofIslam and a great bene-
factor of the Mghan people."3 
Criminal prosecutions are especially ineffective in deterring fundamentalist terrorist 
groups able to recruit individuals willing to sacrifice their lives in suicide bombings. 
These terrorists are not "cowards," as U.S. officials sometimes assert; they are crazed 
killers, as prepared for sacrifice as good soldiers. Anyway, while some will cooperate 
3 Elusive bin Laden Keeps US at Safe Distance, S. CHINA MORNING POST,June 4, 2001. 
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rather than face life imprisonment or death, AI Qaeda and similar organizations limit 
the damage any individual can inflict by functioning in loose-knit cells. 
To treat bin Laden as an enemy of the United States requires more than the prosecu-
tion of underlings, or even a freeze on AI Qaeda's assets and economic sanctions against 
Afghanistan. It requires a shift in attitude from one of responding to terrorist attacks 
as ordinary crimes to one of attempting directly to prevent terrorist groups from carry-
ing out their threats. 
Force is the essential method of protection when all else fails. Every recent U.S. presi-
dent has properly concluded that necessary and proportionate force may lawfully be 
used in foreign territory to prevent attacks by terrorists given sanctuary there. 
But resort to force, even when lawful, does require great care. Mistakes or excessive 
collateral damage can undermine its effectiveness. While the United States is free to act 
unilaterally in its self-defense, it must be prepared to defend its actions or to admit and 
pay for its mistakes. Ultimately, it is not any legal inhibition that accounts for the U.S. 
policy of prosecuting rather than destroying international terrorist groups. Rather, it 
is the claim that such attacks lead to reprisals against the United States, creating a cycle 
of violence, and make terrorists like bin Laden heroes in the eyes of Muslim militants. 
It is clear that militants who publicly commit themselves to attack U.S. targets are not 
going to be deterred by criminal prosecutions; they can only be stopped through effec-
tive action. The key to success is not merely to attack but to attack until the capacity of 
a group to commit acts of terror is destroyed. In no form of real warfare would a com-
batant expect an enemy to cease its attacks merely because of a single, largely symbolic, 
use of force, such as President Clinton's strike against bin Laden in Afghanistan. 
Furthermore, the claim that attacks on terrorists risk violent responses applies equally 
to criminal prosecutions. A criminal-law strategy is as likely to anger terrorists as attacks 
aimed at destroying them, and public trials make them heroes in the eyes of militants. 
Only in the world of computer games can we expect to avoid the real risks of con-
fronting an enemy. 
